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THE POSITION OF INDIVIDUALS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Herbert W. Briggs
In the PELEUS War Crimes Trial, the
British judge advocate characterized
"customary international law" as:
"nothing but a body of rules and
customs, expressing the common sense
of civilized nations." I would like to
make my first parenthetical remark at
this point by saying that I have been
tremendously impressed by' the common sense approach of the draft Law
Instructions for Naval Warfare.
The PELEUS, a Greek tramp
freighter of some 8,800 tons, with a
crew of thirty-five British, Greek,
Egyptian, Chinese, Chilean, Russian and
Polish, was under British charter. She
was torpedoed in the South Atlantic at
about 7:00 P.M. on the evening of
March 13, 1944, on the way from
Freetown to Argentina. She was torpedoed by a German submarine, the
U-852, with Captain Heinz Eck as commander, and she went down immediately.
A few survivors managed to get on
rafts or wreckage. The sub was surfaced
at all times and, after picking up the
ship's third officer and a rating for
questioning, returned them to a raft,
steamed away, about a thousand meters,
and then returned and fired intermittently on the survivors with machine
guns for a period of five hours, with
some of the officers actually throwing
hand grenades. Three men survived the
attempt to exterminate them and were

picked up on April 20, five or six weeks
later, by a )?ortuguese freighter.
The submarine was later capturedon May 2, 1945-after having been
beached off Somaliland as a result of a
British air attack. The U-boat's log, with
German thoroughness, recorded the
sinking of the PELEUS.
The captain, the first officer, the
chief engineer, the ship's doctor (or the
medical officer) and a rating were indicted before a British military tribunal
sitting in Hamburg, Germany, in October, 1945. They were indicted on a
charge not of unlawful sinking but of
committing a war crime: namely, that in
violation of the laws and usages of war
they were concerned in the killing of
members of the crew of the PELEUS,
allied nationals, by firing and throwing
grenades at them.
The captain did not plead the defense of "superior orders." Despite
secret orders, which had been given to
all U-boat commanders leaving Kiel
after September, 1942 (and I quote a
copy which was found): "rescue runs
counter to the rudimentary demands of
warfare for the destruction of enemy
ships and crews," it is ambiguous-.with
reference to the treatment of surviving
crewmen.
There was an attempt in the Donitz
trial, of the major Nuremberg criminals,
to get the official text of this but the
charge against Donitz, based on this
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order, was dropped. I will read it again.
The words are ambiguous. The instructions were given orally to all submarine
commanders. The commander-and possibly the first officer-knew the content
of the secret instructions and others
were aware (according to the evidence
that came out in the trial) that there
were secret instructions, but they did
not know the.ir content. "Rescue runs
counter to the rudimentary demands of
warfare for the destruction of enemy
ships and crews. "
The captain's defense was "operational necessity, " and a denial-in
which all defendants joined-of trying
to kill the survivors. It seemed that
they were merely trying to destroy the
wreckage because four of Germany's
newest, shiniest submarines had gone
down in that area in the preceding
months.
In remaining at the place of sinking,
the submarine lost over five (5) hours.
The testimony showed that she could go
eighteen (18) knots on the surface at
night. The captain, after having the
members of the crew and officers fire
on the wreckage for about five hours,
got underway and then went below to
broadcast to, as he testified, "a somewhat restive crew." He reminded them
that allied aviators were bombing innocent German women and childrenperhaps their wives and children. At the
trial, he was asked why it was necessary
to make this broadcast if he had only
been firing at bits of wreckage.
The first officer had protested to the
captain against the shooting and pointed
out that it was a violation of international law. He went below, made out a
report of interrogatories which he had
had with the third officer of the sunken
ship, came back up and found a seaman
using a machine gun and firing at bits of
wreckage. He grabbed the machine gun
from the sailor and he, himself, fired.
He was asked at the trial why he did
this. He said: "Well, this man had an
illegitimate child and I did not want to

see those people killed by a person of
such a bad character. "
So far as the doctor was concerned,
he was asked if he did not know that
this was contrary to the rules of naval
warfare. He said: "Yes."
They then asked: "Why did you
fire?"
The doctor replied: "Well, it was our
first kill-and it was all very exciting."
For the benefit of a court, which
included British and Greek naval officers, the British judge advocate summed
up in part as follows:
You should be in no way embarrassed or put out by the
alleged complications of international law, which it has been
suggested surround such a case as
this. International law is nothing
but a body of rules which have
been expressed in treaties, or of
customs and usages which express
the common sense of civilized
nations. All of those rules and
usages are based upon the dictates
of ordinary humanity. It is a
fundamental usage of war that the
killing of unarmed enemies is forbidden. It is forbidden as a result
of the experience of civilized
nations throughout many centuries. To fire so as to kill helpless
survivors of a torpedoed ship is a
grave breach against the law of
nations. The right to punish persons who break such rules of war
has equally been recognized for
many years.
Defendants other than the captain
pleaded the defense of "superior
orders." On this point, the judge advocate said this:
It is quite obvious that no sailor
nor no soldier can carry with him
a library of international law, or
have immediate access to a professor in that subject who can tell
him whether or not a particular
command is a lawful one. But
members of the Armed Forces are
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bound to obey lawful orders only,
and it must have been obvious to
the most rudimentary intelligence
that the carrying out of Captain
Heinz Eck's commands involved
the killing of helpless survivors
and was, therefore, not a lawful
command.
The court, basing its opinion somewhat upon the Llandovery Castle casein which, during the First World War, a
German Crimes Court, sitting in Leipzig
after the war, had convicted an officer
and a sailor of a German submarine for
torpedoing a hospital ship and then
firing upon survivors in lifeboats (some
of them did get away)-found all five
(5) defendants guilty. The captain, the
first officer and the medical officer were
sentenced to death by shooting, which
was carried out within three weeks. The
chief engineer and the rating were sentenced to life imprisonment and to
fifteen (15) years, respectively, the plea
of "superior order" having been allowed
in mitigation of sentence although not
as a complete defense against responsibility for the crime.
I might point out that the fifteen
(15) volumes of reported War Crimes
Trials, which were published by the
United Nations War Crimes Tribunal,
stress this point in the concluding volume: that "superior orders" is not a
defense, but may be considered in mitigation of sentence (the same as stated in
your draft of Naval Instructions).
These applications of the law of
nations, that is of the common sense of
civilized nations, have sometimes appeared easier to perform in practice
than the theory of the position of the
individual in international law might
suggest. Doctrinal disputes of almost
bitter intensity have raged over the
question of legal theory as to whether
or not the individual human being is a
subject of international law.
On the one hand it has been argued
(and this is the orthodox view) that
only collective entities, such as States or

organizations of States (like the United
Nations), can be subject to the rights
and duties of international law. That is
what we mean by "subject of intern ationallaw"-one is subject to the rights
and the obligations of international law.
On the other hand it has been
asserted that all law exists to regulate
human conduct; that States and organizations of States can act only through
individuals; and that, therefore, many of
the rules of international law are designed to regulate the conduct of individuals-whether they are acting as
individuals or as agents and officers of
the States.
I am not too concerned about the
doctrinal disputes. We all agree that
much of international law is designed to
require or prohibit certain behavior, or
to further certain processes and procedures. Whether the principles and
rules of international law bear directly
on individuals or only indirectlythrough the incorporation of these rules
of international law into national naval
or army regulations, for example-may
appear important in legal theory. However, these considerations may be immaterial in a practical sense if the
purposes of the law are fulfilled.
For example: in the absence of
. treaties, international.law establishes no
right for the individual to leave his
country of origin, to enter a foreign
country, and to become naturalized
-there or to divest himself of his original
nationality. This is only another way of
saying that the individual has under
international law, in the absence of
treaties, no right of emigration, immigration, naturalization or expatriation. Nor would the individual necessarily have anyone of these rights even
if we labeled him a "subject of international law." Why? If he acquires any of
these rights to change his nationality, to
leave his country to enter another country, the rightsicome to him either from
the law of his domicile or from the law
of his nationality; that is, he derives
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them directly from the place of residence or from the law of the nationality
which he possesses.
It may be that the State of his
domicile, as an alien, and the State of
his nationality have concluded a treaty,
stipulating benefits on his behalf as a
citizen of one State and a resident of
another. In such a case it makes little
practical difference whether the treaty
stipulations are referred to as the
"treaty rights of aliens under intern ationallaw," or as the "obligations of the
State under international law to grant
certain rights to aliens under national
law." In civilized countries, the alien
will have the procedural capacity to
seek in the local courts the benefits
which are stipulated in his behalf by the
treaty.
The common sense of civilized
nations finds comparable expression
with reference to what is called the
"delictual capacity of individuals under
international law." For example, there
is the liability of the individual for the
commission of war crimes. You may
agree with the dictum of the Nuremberg
War Crimes Tribunal that crimes against
international law are committed by
men-not by abstract entities; or, you
may plausibly argue that war crimes,
and so-called "offenses against the law
of nations," are in legal theory violations of national regulations which incorporate by reference the requirements
of international law.
Support for this interpretation can
be found in Hague Convention IV of
1907. By Article 2 of that treaty, the
annexed Hague Regulations Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land
apply "between Contracting Powers";
that is, they are legally binding on
States. Article I requires that: "The
Contracting Powers shall issue instructions to their armed land forces which
shall be in conformity with the Regulations.... "; that is, the States which are
bound by the Hague Regulations as
international law shall transform the

provisions· of those regulations into
national regulations, binding upon individual members of the armed forces.
Thus, whichever legal theory is adopted,
international law and national laws and
regulations are in agreement in stipulating that war crimes-that is, violations
of the laws and customs of war-are acts
entailing individual criminal liability.
From the point of view of the individual
member of the armed forces the practical position is that certain conduct is
forbidden by the rules of warfare. He
knows that the courts will have jurisdiction to try him-and even to impose the
death penalty-for conviction of violating the laws and customs of war.
The fifteen (15) volumes of the
United Nations War Crimes Trials, based
upon decisions of the last war, indicate
that the death penalty was given only in
cases of murder and rape. There may
have been one or two exceptions but in
most cases, although it is possible to
give the death penalty for any war crime
upon conviction, the practice was to
limit it to serious offenses. I have
noticed that the draft regulations of
both the Army and the Navy talk about
"grave offenses" rather than any
violation of the laws of war. Any
violation of the laws of war might be
considered an illegal act, but not all of
them are considered of such a heinous
character as to warrant the death
penalty.
The courts before which the individual member of the armed forces can
be tried may be national military courts
or international military tribunals, set
up as such through international agreement between States. Although procedural law will vary in different courts
between different national courts, and
as between international courts and
national courts, the substantive content
of the law which all of these courts
(national and international) will apply
will be quite the same: the traditionally
accepted laws and customs of war.
The jurisdiction which international
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law permits States to exercise over
persons charged with war crimes is
broad and comprehensive. It has sometimes been stated as follows: -"International law obligates States to exercise
jurisdiction over their own nationals for
war crimes and authorizes them to try
and punish certain enemy nations for
violations of the laws of war. " However,
such jurisdiction is not limited to nationals and enemy nationals.
Following the Second World War, the
United States military courts tried and
convicted Spanish, Dutch and Yugoslav
citizens (the Spanish, at least, were
neutrals) for violations of the laws of
war. British military courts similarly
convicted Swiss and Danish citizens.
French military courts convicted Poles,
Belgians, Italians, Luxembourgers,
Frenehmen, and, of course, Germans.
An interesting situation arose in the
Paeific. The transcript of the trial is not
reported in these volumes but there is a
summary, which I will quote:
In the trial of one Shimio, of
the Japanese Army, before a
British military court sitting at
Singapore, the accused was
charged, found guilty, and sentenced to death by hanging by a
court consisting of British officers
only, for having unlawfully killed
American prisoners of war In
French Indo-China.
In other words, the place where the
crime was committed was French territory; the nationals injured were Americans; and the court was made up exclusively of British officers.
Mr. Willard B. Cowles, who is now
the Assistant Legal Adviser of the Department of State, has concluded, after
a study of jurisdiction over war crimes,
that every independent State has jurisdiction to punish war criminals in its
custody-regardless of the nationality of
the victim, the nationality of the perpetrator, or the place where the offense
was committed. Physical custody of the
accused, rather than any principle of the

territoriality of criminal law, seems to
be the jurisdictional criterion. Of course
some States have limited the jurisdiction
of their own national courts so as not to
take full benefit of this principle of
universality.
There was a case of one Wagner, who
was tried and acquitted before a French
military court, where evidence showed
that he had committed a war crime. But
that war crime had not been one listed
in the French Penal Code and the
particular tribunal had been authorized
to try persons only where there was a
concordance between international law
and French national law. So in this case
he escaped on a technicality.
I have no reliable statistics, and I
have not been able to get any, on the
number of persons tried and convicted
on charges of war crimes. However, of
the fifteen (15) volumes published by
the United Nations War Crimes Commission, the last volume (published in
1949) states that the Commission had
received the transcripts of 1,911 trial
records-an admittedly incomplete list,
since some States had not complied
with the request for sending in transcripts. I understand that this figure
may even be off by as much as 1,000. In
other words, we know that there were
1,911 trials, but there may have been
one thousand other war crimes trials
following the Second World War in
which transcripts were not sent to the
Commission. It is important to note
that these 1,911 trials dealt with war
crimes in the traditional sense of the
term: namely, violations of the laws and
customs of war. The fifteen (15 volumes
of Law Reports present a selected
number of 89 trials and there are
penetrating legal analyses of the cases
which have been appended by Mr.
George Brand, a British lawyer. If there
is little novelty in the findings of these
courts, it may be because, as one writer
has said, "all the offenses of any importance which the term "war crime"
properly denotes are old and well
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known in the law of war." The facts
may differ, but the offenses are not
new. In any case, this collection provides a substantial body of new case law
on traditional war crimes.
The novelty of the Nuremberg Trial
of the major war criminals lay not in its
proceedings and findings with reference
to traditional war crimes, but in certain
other features. Of the major war criminals convicted at Nuremberg, all except
three were found guilty of traditional
war crimes. Why, then, did it appear
necessary or desirable to indict the
major war criminals at Nuremberg and
at Tokyo for crimes against peace and
crimes against humanity? Most of the
latter were subsumed under war crimes,
anyway, and they were more often than
not identical. The answer appears to lie in
political rather than legal considerations.
A group of crusaders (this is a valuejudgment and there are some people
who feel strongly that that is not the
term which should be used to describe
them, but I am giving my own opinion on
it) set out to establish "aggressive war"
as a crime under international law and
to establish individual criminal liability
theref!Jre ex post facto, which is also a
conclusion that I am drawing. It was
easy enough to secure agreement to the
phrases in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which is annexed to the London Agreement of
August 8, 1945. In Article 6, for example (you are familiar with this, but I
will read it anyway): "The following
acts, or anyone of them, are crimes
coming within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal for which there shall be individual criminal responsibility." Then,
they list the categories: "crimes against
peace, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, the common plan or conspiracy. "
I would like to quote the first oneCrimes Against Peace-from paragraph
(a) of Article VI of the London Charter:
Crimes Against Peace; namely,
planning, preparation, initiation

or waging of a war of aggression,
or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or
assurances, or participation in a
common plan or conspiracy for
the accomplishment of any of the
foregoing.
I think that the evidence shows these
provisions were rather hastily drafted. I
think they may have been drafted with
dangerous haste. Let me examine for a
moment some of the words (I will leave
out some of the words, but I will read
only words which are incorporated in
the provisions in order to give you an
example).
You are engaged here in the planning
and the preparation, not of a war of
aggression, but of possible tactics and
strategy in a situation against Country
"X" or Country "Y." You are not
planning a war of aggression; you are
not planning a war in violation of a
treaty. But suppose that we should get
involved with Communist China in hostilities (we don't have to lose the war).
One of you mIght be picked up and
charged with the following, based on
Paragraph (a) (Crimes Against Peace):
namely, that at the Naval War College,
Newport, Rhode Island, you planned or
prepared a war in violation of international assurances. The assurances might
be one by Mr. Dulles saying that we are
not going to attaek them or it might be
one by Mr. Walter Robertson. Of
course, I am giving you a hypothetical
case. I should add that the Nuremberg
Tribunal did not apply these provisions
in this way-they did not try to convict
people merely on the "planning" and
"preparation." They went on to the
"initiation" of the war, which was one
of the main points they tried to prove,
and also the "waging of a war of
aggression. "What I am suggesting is that
leaving on the books vague terms like
the planning or preparation of a war in
which you might happen to be a prisoner may lead your captors to say: "At
the Naval War College did you not plan

421
and did you not go to war in violation
of assurances?" The words are twisted
by your captors, but that is not the
point.
Agreement to these terms. was
secured from twenty-three (23) States
(the original drafters and nineteen (19)
other States agreed to them) at London
prior to the Nuremberg Trial. After the
trial, Justice Robert H. Jackson, who
had been the Chief Counsel for the
United States in the prosecution of the
major German war criminals, observed:
"The Nuremberg Trial avoided wrangles
over definitions and deals with the
clean-cut challenge: Is it a crime to
make a war of aggression?"
It was somewhat disconcerting to
find Justice Jackson writing two pages
later: "This question-whether it is a
crime to conduct a war of aggression-is
not technically an issue in the trial
itself, having been foreclosed by the
specific terms of the London Agreement. "
Two questions of at least possible
interest to international lawyers were
apparently not decided by the Court,
namely: (1) whether aggressive war was
an international crime prior to the
London Agreement of 1945; and, (2),
whether, if it was a crime before 1945,
there existed in law at the time the acts
charged were committed individual
criminal liability therefor on the part of
agents of the aggressive State.
What do I mean by saying "whether
there existed in law?" It is obvious that
there did not exist in German law any
provisions making illegal the "planning,
preparation, initiation or waging of a
war of aggression, or a war in violation
of international treaties, agreements or
assurances.... " The question was: Was
there any other system of law which
applied? That threw the Court back to
international law in an attempt to discover whether international law had
made aggressive war a crime at the time
the acts were committed-not later, but
at the time the acts were committed.

However, the Tribunal consistently
held, in its judgment of October 1,
1946, that it was bound by the London
Charter, which "is decisive and binding
upon the Tribunal" and "the law to be
applied in the case. " Although the court
stated that it was not strictly necessary
to consider whether, or to what extent,
aggressive war was a crime before the
London Agreement of 1945, the court
sought obiter dictum-that is, it was
unnecessary intellectual exercise; they
sought to establish that aggressive war
was not only illegal but criminal prior to
the London Charter. The evidence was
weak-a series of unratified draft
treaties and declaratory or declamatory
resolutions, some of which had been
passed by the League of Nations, none
of which laid down the law, none of
which ever came into force, and none of
which ever acquired any legal significance of a binding nature upon the
behavior of States or of individuals.
There was left the Kellogg Pact,
which, even if it made certain wars
illegal-and people have asserted that it
did make some wars illegal, but that, in
my judgment, is doubtful because of the
extensive right of self-defense as determined by the State employing it and the
so-called "reservations" which preceded
its enactment-certainly contained no
provisions establishing the criminality of
aggressive war or the individual liability
of those who initiate or wage it.
The net result has been that the
justifiable findings of the Nuremberg
Tribunal on traditional crimes have been
overshadowed by a polemical controversy as to what the Nuremberg Trial
really established and as to its value as a
precedent. Justice Jackson 'thought that
certainly no future lawyer or nation,
undertaking to prosecute crimes against
the peace of the world, would have to
face the argument that the effort was
unprecedented. But Professor Hans
Kelsen, one of the world's great jurists,
has elaborately questioned whether in a
legal sense the trial constitutes any
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precedent at all, since, as he says, it was
a case in which a specially-created court
applied specially-created law to a designated group of people, most of whom
(happily for us) have now expired. The
precedentary value-that is, the value of
Nuremherg as a precedent-can he left
in aheyance and if States wish to estahlish the Nuremherg principles as the
international law for future application
they are entitled to do so, without
proving that this was decided at Nuremherg.
Attempts to do this have heen zealously pursued hy representatives of certain States in the United Nations. The
project has taken two forms: (1) the
attempt to estahlish a permanent international criminal court; and, (2) the
attempt to estahlish a hody of international criminal law for that court to
apply. Understandahly, the attempts to
create the law have preceded the attempts to set up a court to apply the
law.
In a hroad sense, the formulation of
a hody of international criminal law has
heen pursued along three related lines:
(1) a code, formulating the principles of
international law recognized in the
Charter and judgment of the Nuremherg
Trihunal of the major war criminals
(that is printed in one of the notes to
your draft instructions); (2) a code of
offenses against the peace and security
of mankind; and (3) the genocide convention, which entered into force (it is
already in force) in 1951-although not
for the United States. The genocide
convention is not ordinarily included in
this category, hut what I am dealing
with here is: (1) you are trying to set up
a court; (2) you are trying to find a
hody of law for that court to apply-the
hody of law will include the formulation of the Nuremherg principles for the
future and it will also include the draft
code of offenses, if it ever goes into
effect; (3) the genocide convention in
effect dealt not with war crimes hut
with what was suhsumed under the

ruhric of crimes against humanity, and
is comparahle to that. By the genocide
convention the High Contracting Parties
confirm that genocide is a crime under
international law, which they undertake
to prevent and punish. Whether persons
committing it are constitutionally responsihle rulers, puhlic officials, or
private individuals, they shall he tried
hy a competent trihunal of the State in
the territory of which the act was
committed; that is to say, if this had
heen in force twelve years ago the
Germans would have tried Hitler for
genocide. Or, if the Communists do not
want to try Malenkov (mayhe I had
hetter leave him out and say Khrushchev and some of the others), there is
another ohligation: if you do not try
your own Heads of States and rulers for
this crime of genocide, then you are
legally ohligated to suhmit this man to
an international court if there is such a
court and if you have accepted the
jurisdiction of that court. I am not
distressed hecause the United States has
not ratified the genocide convention
he cause it seems to me, although it does
estahlish a principle in Article 1 that
genocide is an evil thing, that the other
terms appear to be almost fraudulent. I
shall say nothing more ahout this third
category hecause it is estahlished, a
great many States have ratified this
convention.
Still dealing with the establishment
of a hody of international criminal law ,
the formulation of the Nuremberg Principles was intended to establish principles of' international criminal law for
future application so as to avoid the
charge made at Nuremherg that the
application of these provisions was ex
post facto, or, that it was not law and
the people were not individually responsihle under that non-existent law at the
time of the Trial. The formulation was
entrusted to the United Nations International Law Commission, which, after
some dehate, declined to express any
opinion as to the legal character of the
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Nuremberg judgment and prineiples;
that is to say, they deliberately refused
to deeide or to express an opinion as to
whether or not the Nuremberg Charter
and, judgment expressed preexisting law
before 1945,whether it created new law
as of 1945, or whether they had established a law for the future.
The Nuremberg Principles, formulated by the United Nations International Law Commission, consisted
largely of a mere restatement of principles found in the London Charter and
the Nuremberg judgment. When the
Second Report of the International Law
Commission containing this formulation
went to the General Assembly of the
United Nations in 1950, doctrinal
battles were reopened in the Legal
Committee of the Assembly over the
question as to whether the Nuremberg
Principles accurately expressed existing
international law. The General Assembly, without expressing any opinion
on this question, invited the governments of Members of the United
Nations to make observation on the
International Law Commission's draft.
They requested the Commission to take
into account the governments' observations when it prepared its second codethe Draft Code of Offenses Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind. Of sixty
(60) governments requested to make
observations on the International Law
Commission's draft, only seven (7) had
sufficient interest to reply. Of these
seven, only the French and Lebanese
replies contained detailed observations
of any value. That is to say, fifty-three
(53) States did not even reply and
fifty-eight (58) did not send in any
comments of value.
The International Law Commission,
at the request of the General Assembly,
has also formulated and reformulated a
Draft Code of Offenses Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind. The
contents of this draft code are in part an
elaboration of some of the Nuremberg
Principles, but they go beyond the

Nuremberg Principles in treating genocide, certain forms of intervention by
one State in the affairs of another State,
certain terrorist activities fostered by
one State against another, and illegal
annexation of another State's territory,
as crimes under international law for
which the responsible individuals shall
be punished.
Although delegates of some of the
countries argue that this is already
international law, there is an overwhelming expression of opinion in the
United Nations' organs that these are
not international law-that they could
become such if enacted in a treaty and
if the treaty were ratified. Some of
them have argued that it is highly
desirable that this should be done. But I
would like to point out that some of
these principles are not an expression of
existing international law any more than
the Nuremberg principles were.
At its Ninth Session, in 1954, the
General Assembly decided to postpone
further discussion of the draft code
until after a special committee had
reported on a more basic question,
namely: How is aggression defined?
There have been three (3) committees
on this subject and there is a history
that goes back to the days of the League
of Nations. The be~t definition that I
have ever seen of "aggression" was one
which Maxim Litvinoff, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, introduced
into the League of Nations before the
Soviets invaded the Baltic States. It was
about as good a definition as I think
you can get.
Again, there has been quite a doctrinal debate as to how to go about the
definition. Should one enumerate that
the following things are aggression and
list them: A, B, C, D, E, et cetera? Or, if
that is done, will some new techniques
of the "cold war" be forgotten? Therefore, some people argue to set up a
general formula which will say that acts
of a certain kind in certain relationships
are aggression, while others say that one
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cannot in advance formulate a hardand-fast definition. But, pending another try by another committee (I
believe it is the third) of the United
Nations to formulate a definition of
"aggression," they have laid on the shelf
the reformulation of Offenses Against
the Peace and Security of Mankind.
Discussion of the establishment of a
proposed International Criminal Court
has likewise been postponed. There have
been two Commissions of the United
Nations dealing with this and they have
come up with somewhat differing texts
(some of you have read them). They are
very elaborate, and, again, they are not
an expression of existing law. They are
an attempt to devise a court and deal
with its jurisdiction. Buf that question
has been postponed; the question of the
Code on Offenses Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind has been postponed; and the Nuremberg Principles
are dormant, as far as immediate action
is concerned, because States have not
shown sufficient interest in their formulation.
Professor Jean Spiropoulos, the
Greek member of the Sixth Committee,
and a member also of the International
Law Commission, may not have been
far wrong when he observed !hat it will
be "a long time" before the General
Assembly takes up again the question of
establishing an International Criminal
Court.
Mr. G.G. Fitzmaurice, the Legal
Adviser of the British Foreign Office
and the British representative in the
Sixth Committee, observed in the Committee that such a court (the proposed
International Criminal Court) could
consider only two types of crimes: (1)
traditional war crimes; and, (2), the
non-traditional Nuremberg offenses, or
the Offenses Against Peace and Security. The former, traditional war
crimes, will probably be dealt with in
future wars by national or international
military tribunals, just as we have done
in the past. Possibly we might add

neutral ju~ges, but it seems unlikely
that persons charged with traditional
war crimes would be sent to this new
court for it would be inconvenient-you
would have to have a location somewhere and they would be tried all over
the world, just as they have been. It was
unfortunate, but the General Assembly
should face realistically the fact that it
would be possible to bring to justice
after a war only war criminals of defeated countries. Therefore, the
proposed permanent International
Criminal Court, in the British view,
would be dealing only with the second
category-Offenses Against the Peace of
Mankind-which have not been clearly
formulated and for which, moreover,
governments would be unlikely to surrender persons to be tried unless the
countries were defeated. The British
view was, therefore, that it is all right to
talk about the court-but they took a
rather dim view of it.
Where, then, do we stand with regard
to the position of the individual in
international law? The prospects of
establishing a permanent International
Criminal Court, with adequate jurisdiction to try individuals for violations of
international law, are remote; nor are
the prospects for agreement upon a
Code of International Criminal Law
much healthier. Some of the provisions
of the draft Code of Offenses Against
the Peace of Mankind are so far-fetched
that they have not even been able to
command the support of international
lawyers, let alone governments. The
formulation of the Nuremberg Principles is far from general acceptance as a
statement of existing international law.
In civilized countries, the individual will
continue to benefit from the standards
established by international law for his
protection, and he will continue to be
individually liable for traditional war
crimes whether or not we confer upon
him the label "subject of international
law." In time, the common sense of
civilized nations may come to establish
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more adequate convenants for the protection of human rights and it may
come to establish individual responsibility for aggressive war.
The late Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes once transfixed a colleague of

mine, Professor Carl Becker, and suddenly demanded: "What do you think
of the prospects of the human race?"
Professor Becker, a gentle scholar,
replied: "I wish them well, but I am not
overly sanguine. "
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